Federalist 53
Scholars dispute the authorship of Federalist 53, as did Hamilton and Madison. On the heels of Madison’s deft analyses in 47-52 one could reasonably assume that he wrote 53 as well. I doubt that is the case. The style as well as mode of argument seems very much like Hamilton to me. That said, he does continue Madison’s line of argument from 52 concerning the House of Representatives and the mode of selection.
Publius begins by making what we might take to be an obvious observation: there is no correlation between the rotations of the earth around the sun and how frequently we ought to have elections. The sun is indifferent to good government and the protections of liberty. Certainly Publius operated here with the assumptions of modern cosmology and its disruption of the relationship between anthropology and cosmology, suggesting no necessary connection. In an earlier time it was assumed that human beings mirrored the universe and the universe mirrored us, one example being that the number of planets had to be identical to the number of orifices in the human head. One historian described the disruption as the move from the closed world to the infinite universe; in the former human beings had to adjust themselves to the rhythms of nature, while in the latter they tried to force nature to bend to their control. Perhaps it’s the case that the rhythms of the cosmos bear not at all on the frequency of elections, but Publius seems awfully glib in the assertion.
We could do worse than to suggest that elections should strictly follow the calendar, for whatever reason. Publius does raise the question that, if the seasons determine the protections of liberty, we might want to consider holding elections twice a year, four times a year, twelve times a year, or even daily. Of course, on the other side of that argument is: why two year terms for members of the House? Why not four, or six, or twenty?
Annual or Biennial Eelctions?
At the time of ratification Rhode Island had Connecticut held semi-annual elections for its popular branch, South Carolina biennial, and all the other states annual. Publius observed that the first two states were no freer nor any better governed as a result of their shorter terms. Granted, most citizens preferred annual elections of House members, but mainly because that was what they were used to. Reason, Publius said, did not support the habit.
Why did Brutus believe “that where annual elections end, tyranny begins?” Where did the habit come from? Publius claimed that in Great Britain, where there was no written constitution, Parliament had the power to undo the terms of government itself. In America, where government was constituted by the people, only the people could reconstitute it; Congress could not change the structure of government through simple legislative acts. In Britain, Publius continued, Parliament frequently passed laws changing the length of terms while they were in session. This abuse of power put English liberty perpetually at risk, but in America such risks were mitigated by both the source and the structure of the Constitution. Annual elections only make sense where additional security against government power is needed.
The massive increase in government power suggests it may be prudent to revisit the idea of annual elections. After all, the connection between Congress and the people seems largely broken, and if Publius is right that nothing in the nature of things recommends one length of terms versus another, why not revisit (via constitutional amendment)? Granted, most Americans probably cringe at the idea of more elections, and at this point may be so cynical about the process and outcomes that they see little value in greater frequency, but that testifies to the stretching of democratic politics too far beyond its local limits.
Publius Defends Biennial Elections
Publius actually offers this as a defense of biennial elections. At the local and state level elected representatives will possess intimate knowledge of the people, of their situations, of the problems they face, and the social and cultural features of those particular places. Annual elections make sense when representatives are familiar with places, but in an extended republic such familiarity does not exist. Elected officials won’t know anything about the places concerning which they must make decisions. They won’t know the cultures of those places, the specific needs and interests, nor the laws and regulations. The further away they are from a place the more they are in need of education, and this longer tutelage was the central argument for biennial rather than annual elections.
No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of men in private as well as public stations. Another part can only be attained, or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station which requires the use of it.
No doubt experience counts for something — indeed, a great deal — in politics. But experience in what, exactly? The Anti-federalists believed that experience in the lives and loves and fortunes of one’s neighbors counted most, and that experience could be channeled into but also provide boundaries for political contestation. The unruliness of people could be mitigated by virtue on the one hand and shared fate on the other. Publius seemed to think that the experience that counts was of a more technical nature: familiarity with laws and regulations and faraway places was what mattered.
Publius argued that national politics necessarily required a redirecting of vision. Representatives must familiarize themselves with other states, but also other nations. “In regulating our own commerce,” Publius continued, the representative “ought to be not only acquainted with the treaties between the United States and other nations, but also with the commercial policy and laws of other nations.” Publius may have seen this as an expansion of vision, but the Anti-federalists saw it as a turning away from the near-at-hand to distant horizons. After all, by this logic, why stop at a national government? Wouldn’t Publius’s argument necessarily lead to the formation of an international government?
What Has Our Attention?
In a telling phrase, Publius referred to “the practical attention” of representatives. While the debate over whether to have annual or biennial elections for members of the House may seem fairly arcane to us, the central issue really was the one of what would command the practical attention of representatives. In an interesting turn of argument, Publius suggested that annual terms, accompanied by term limits, would actually increase the likelihood that persons with suspect motives would seek office. Furthermore, such persons would be less likely to resist the temptations of power. Only those who rewarded public confidence would return to Washington.
A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will possess superior talents; will, by frequent reelections, become members of long standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages. The greater the proportion of new members, and the less the information of the bulk of the members the more apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid for them.
The metaphor may be unintentionally instructive since Publius spent little time discussing what those snares might be. The Anti-federalists had an idea, however. Foreign intrigue, money, unaccountable power, organized interests, corporate actors — all these were lying-in-wait for those on the road to Washington. (If you haven’t watched Mr. Smith Goes to Washington you should to see that these worries persist.) Perhaps Publius was right that these thorough “masters of the public business” proved better at resisting such temptations, but the further they were away from their homes, both in time and space, the Anti-federalists believed, the more likely a different set of values and interests would come to dominate.
This is especially so when we consider that people in Washington will come to consider their “experience” and mastery of legislation and superior knowledge as self-justifying measures. Many neophytes swept into Congress in 1994 as part of Newt Gingrich’s “Contract with America,” promising to serve two or three terms, only to renege on those promises because they discovered that, once there, “experience” and “a broadened perspective” trumped keeping one’s word. In most relationships, however, we think keeping promises is more important than expertise. Ask your spouses and children if you don’t believe me.
Stolen Elections
Publius offered up one other justification for biennial elections, again relevant for our time. He assumed that elections would frequently be contested, in no small part because one could count on nefarious goings-on at the ballot box. Because election processes would often be open to machinations and thus outcomes to questioning, a system had to be put into place that would allow for investigation and recounts. Given the amount of time required, in a system of annual elections a representative who stole the election would serve half a term before it would be determined he should not have been seated at all. Biennial elections, Publius claimed, would protect the public against the chaos created by contestation.
Publius readily conceded that the arguments for longer terms — that nothing in the nature of things should fix the length — cut the other way as well. Such determinations result from experimentation and sound reasoning. The question of “how long should a term be?” seems to me less interesting than the reasons given, and if the main reason is “the longer the term the more experience and expertise a person acquires,” the Anti-federalist question of experience and expertise in what, exactly, will continue to resound.
Director of the Ford Leadership Forum, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Foundation
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