President Ford’s Pacific Doctrine Deserves Review

Heritage

Aug 13

President Ford’s 1975 Pacific Doctrine, had it been successfully implemented and managed by succeeding administrations, could have resulted in a more consistent U.S. foreign policy with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Congress should review and adapt the Ford Doctrine to gain a stronger and less tense diplomatic relationship between our countries.

On December 7, 1975, President Ford, speaking at the University of Hawaii’s East-West Center on the 34th anniversary of Pearl Harbor, announced a new Pacific Doctrine, also called the Ford Doctrine, dedicated to “a new future of interdependence and cooperation with all peoples of the Pacific.” After the fall of Saigon, President Ford believed he could achieve better relations through interdependent and peaceful partnerships in the Pacific. Asian leaders favored Ford’s approach, though, in the aftermath of Watergate and Vietnam, pundits and members of Congress were skeptical.

The Ford Doctrine was crafted by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, likely with input from former President Nixon and his former Washington aides. In 1969, Nixon, in response to the Vietnam War, announced the Nixon Doctrine that ended ground troops in foreign wars. Under the policy, the U.S. would provide only military and financial assistance to allied countries that came under military threats. The Ford Doctrine, in contrast to the Nixon Doctrine, would work diplomatically to prevent military threats from arising in the Pacific.

When he spoke in Hawaii, President Ford had just returned from a 7-day, 27,000-mile trip to the PRC, Indonesia, and the Philippines. “I subscribe to a Pacific doctrine of peace with all and hostility toward none,” Ford said at the East-West Center.

“The center of political power in the United States has shifted westward,” Ford said. “Our Pacific interests and concerns have increased.” The “interests and concerns” in the Pacific remain critical to U.S. foreign policy.

Ford wisely told his audience, “The security concerns of great world powers intersect in Asia.” He said that a responsible foreign policy in the Pacific was essential to the United States.

The Ford Doctrine included six points. First, “American strength is basic to any stable balance of power in the Pacific.” Secondly, a “partnership with Japan is a pillar of our strategy.” Third, Ford called for a continuation of “the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China.” Fourth, he called for continued “stability and security in Southeast Asia.” The fifth tenet of the doctrine was “peace in Asia depends upon a resolution of outstanding political conflicts,” especially in Korea where, he said, “tensions persist.” Ford’s final point was “that peace in Asia requires a structure of economic cooperation reflecting the aspiration of all the peoples in the region.”

Ford talked about the rapid growth in the economies of the Asian Pacific nations. He characterized U.S. relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries as “marked by growing maturity and by more modest and more realistic expectations on both sides.” The president said Asian countries seek futures of self-reliance with the U.S. and within the region.

Ford reassured allies that “the United States is a Pacific nation.” The President pledged he would “continue America's active concern for Asia and our presence in the Asian-Pacific region.”

“We can contribute to a new structure of stability [in Asia] founded on a balance among the major powers, strong ties to our allies in the region, an easing of tension between adversaries, the self-reliance and regional solidarity of smaller nations, and expanding economic ties and cultural exchanges,” Ford said.

“If we can remain steadfast, historians will look back and view the 1970's as the beginning of a period of peaceful cooperation and progress, a time of growing community for all the nations touched by this great [Pacific] ocean,” President Ford said.

In 1975, the Ford Doctrine suffered due to the Washington political climate in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, Nixon's resignation, Ford’s pardon of Nixon, and the fall of Saigon. The Ford Doctrine also suffered due to comparisons with the 1969 Nixon Doctrine that sought to end the Americanization of the Vietnam War by letting South Vietnam defend itself, a process called Vietnamization. At the time, the public was highly critical of any mention of Nixon, even for his successful foreign policy. Politics interfered with Ford’s statesmanship and seasoned reasoning on foreign policy in the Pacific. As a result, U.S.-PRC relations suffered.

However, the Ford Doctrine had an important supporter in then-Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT), who called it “a most important historical document.” Mansfield served as U.S. Ambassador to Japan from 1977 to 1988.

A 1975 UPI article also praised the Ford Doctrine, finding it “offers a lower, but firm U.S. profile in Asia” where the U.S. has military outposts, substantial investments, and long-term ties with countries like the Philippines, Japan, and Korea. This was an accurate account of the Ford Doctrine without political bias.

After Nixon’s resignation, the U.S. Department of State wanted to forget him and his leadership on foreign policy. The press largely ignored the Ford Doctrine in 1975. Politics interfered with a valuable foreign policy approach that could have produced better long-term U.S.-PRC relations. After 50 years, it is time to put politics aside for a serious historical reassessment of the Ford Doctrine.

Everything President Ford said about the Pacific and its future was true. In 1975, U.S. trade with East Asia was $46 billion. In 2025, it was nearly $600 billion. U.S. trade and security agreements with the region are vitally important to future peace, security, and stability.

Without the “firm U.S. profile in Asia” that President Ford sought in the Ford Doctrine, regional challenges by the PRC could lead to more trade disruptions and increased diplomatic challenges. President Ford realized that “peace in Asia depends upon a resolution of outstanding political conflicts.”

“Peace in Asia,” as President Ford said, “requires a structure of economic cooperation reflecting the aspiration of all the peoples in the region.” This was among the reasons that President Nixon sought to normalize relations with the PRC in 1971. Historian John King Fairbank gave a more thorough historical explanation of the politics of the Nixon-Ford foreign policy in his book “The United States and China.”

The recent incident where a PRC nuclear submarine made a surprise launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile with a dummy warhead in the Indo-Pacific was confirmation of what President Ford said over fifty years ago: “The security concerns of great world powers intersect in Asia.