Entangling Grudges: Washington's Other Warning
[The views and opinions presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.]
In his 1796 farewell address, George Washington famously cautioned about the dangers to liberty of the United States entering into entangling alliances. What is often forgotten is that in the same address he warned first against maintaining persistent grudges in foreign policy:
…nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and passionate attachments for others, should be excluded; and that, in place of them, just and amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated. The nation which indulges towards another a habitual hatred or a habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. Antipathy in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur. Hence, frequent collisions, obstinate, envenomed, and bloody contests. The nation, prompted by ill-will and resentment, sometimes impels to war the government, contrary to the best calculations of policy. The government sometimes participates in the national propensity, and adopts through passion what reason would reject; at other times it makes the animosity of the nation subservient to projects of hostility instigated by pride, ambition, and other sinister and pernicious motives. The peace often, sometimes perhaps the liberty, of nations, has been the victim.
The American military should prepare to win all manner of wars—large and small, likely and unlikely, defensive and expeditionary—because winning such wars is first and foremost why the military exists. Winning wars requires an intense focus on purposeful violence and lethality, because organized and purposeful violence and lethality are essential to the nature of war. They are what make war distinctive from other human interactions.
The violence and lethality of war beget the ultimate finality, death. That truth perhaps helps explain why strategy, a concept born of war, is oriented towards discrete and identifiable objectives. If the connection between death and objectives sounds farfetched, consider some doctrinal synonyms for “objective”: “end state,” or, even better, “termination.”
The resulting horrors of war are as sadly persistent as wars themselves, which is why military men and women abhor the very thing they must master. Ulysses S. Grant, America’s greatest general, is renowned for promising “to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer,” but desperately wanted his legacy to be the words emblazoned on his tomb: “Let Us Have Peace.” Nevertheless, for military men and women, the paradoxical calculation is always the same: warmaking prevents wars. The demonstrated capability to win wars is the best prevention of the outbreak of war. That is the essential contribution of the military to foreign policy, which exists above and beyond, and as something greater than strategy in war.
Foreign policy is different than strategy because it is not at its core about making war. Violence and lethality are not part of foreign policy’s essential nature. The stakes are enormous but not oriented toward the finality of death. More simply, foreign policy does not end, so it is not really objectives based. Rather, it is aspirational, directional—it has aims it pursues. More concretely, foreign policy is about advocating and advancing ideals and interests through negotiation, influence, persuasion, and compromise. Foreign policy is not won, it is managed. To be managed well, as Washington warned, it must not be enslaved to “permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations.”
The United States government and its representatives regularly ignore that warning in their foreign policy by openly expressing antipathies against particular nations. That “habitual hatred,” that “antipathy in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury,” is magnified by the conflation of strategy, a war concept, with foreign policy. For example, the National Security Strategy provides “the executive branch’s national security vision to the legislative branch,” and that vision is also used as guidance in the executive branch, especially by the Departments of State and Defense.
The 2022 version of this so-called strategy repeatedly named specific nations as “competitors,” “challenges,” and “threats.” The great examples are China and Russia. The former is the great competitor, the “pacing challenge,” and the latter is the “acute threat.” Iran and North Korea are also named as challenges and threats.
The United States is at war with none of those countries. At best, such language represents the guidance for prudent military preparations for war taking over the guidance for actual day-to-day foreign policy.
At worst, these labels are exactly what Washington warned about: standing antipathies toward particular nations, with whom we are increasingly disposed “to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur.” The result of that, Washington averred, is the exact opposite of the deterrence we seek: “frequent collisions, obstinate, envenomed, and bloody contests.”
None of this is to say, and Washington did not say, that American foreign policy should be toothless. The military must diligently go about its duty to prepare to fight and win wars, giving foreign policy the necessary forceful backing. Certainly, the United States does not have to go so far as to love the sinner while hating the sin. Rather, American foreign policy need be disinterested toward misbehaving nations while it deals firmly with their harmful policies and actions.
China does threatening things. China is not a threat. The line is fine but necessary to walk. There is room to negotiate, influence, persuade, and compromise with a China that sometimes does threatening things. A China that is a threat is only a threat, not a potential partner in anything. A China that is a threat is an enemy. The same goes for Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Nothing is more fundamental to American foreign policy ideals. The Declaration of Independence itself promised to hold Great Britain, “as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends.”
The United States must avoid entangling grudges. A good start would be to stop expressing foreign policy priorities in wartime terms. The peace and even the liberty of nations is at stake.
Professor at U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations.
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